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The Court of Appeal in McDonald v McDonald [2014] EWCA Civ 1049 refused to 
introduce a proportionality assessment into the process of granting a possession order 
under section 21 Housing Act 1988. In reaching this conclusion, the court engaged 
with, but ultimately rejected, the possibility of horizontal effect of article 8 in relation 
to possession actions against tenants by private landlords. The result in this case is 
correct – there is no opportunity within the statutory scheme for a proportionality 
assessment. If one is required, the statutory provisions must be amended, but the 
court’s reasoning in reaching this result fails to distinguish between direct horizontal 
effect, whereby an obligation is imposed onto the landlord, and statutory horizontal 
effect whereby an obligation is imposed onto the court through the interpretation 
obligation of section 3(1) HRA 1998. This results in a misrepresentation of the 





Miss McDonald suffered a mental disorder making her particularly sensitive to 
changes of environment. Her parents had purchased for her a house, which they had 
leased to her under an assured shorthold tenancy. They had financed the purchase 
through a mortgage. The lease was in breach of the terms of the mortgage. When they 
fell into default on the mortgage payments, the lender appointed receivers. The 
receivers proceeded to make an application under section 21 Housing Act 1998 for an 




Under the terms of section 21, the receivers were undoubtedly entitled to a possession 
order. The section specifies that where a tenancy is an assured shorthold tenancy, the 
landlord is entitled to a possession order provided that the appropriate notice has been 
served on the tenant. The court has no discretion either to refuse or to delay such an 
order. However, Miss McDonald argued that her human rights were affected by such 
a possession order so that an assessment of the proportionality of granting the order 
was required, (at [4]). The court rejected this argument, (at [19]).  
 
Firstly, the court held that article 8 was engaged, (at [12]). Miss McDonald was 
potentially losing possession of her home so that her human rights were indeed 
brought into play. Secondly, the court acknowledged that, as a public authority, it was 
bound by Convention rights by virtue of section 6 Human Rights Act 1998, (at [13]). 
Thirdly, the court concluded, despite this, that it was not bound to apply a 
proportionality test to the situation before it, and that it was obligated to make a 
possession order because, (at [19]): (a) there is no clear and consistent line of case law 
from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that a proportionality test must 
be applied (so that even if possible, section 21 does not need to be interpreted to as to 
incorporate a proportionality assessment), (at [19(1)]); and (b) the Court was bound 
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by the decision in Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v 
Donoghue [2001] EWCA Civ 595, [2002] QB 48 that section 21 was compliant with 
the Convention in any case, (at [19(iii)]).  The court then went onto hold that even if a 
proportionality test were necessary, it would not have availed Miss McDonald in any 
case as a possession order would be proportionate in this case, (at [53]). Finally, the 
court held that the receivers were able to serve the appropriate section 21 notice, (at 
[65]), and therefore a possession order was granted. This case note will focus on the 
first three aspects of the court’s decision. 
 
Article 8 is engaged and the court is a public authority 
 
The first two conclusions – i.e. the engagement of article 8, and the fact of the Court’s 
being a public authority, are uncontroversial. As Arden LJ explains: “there is nothing 
in Article 8 to exclude a home that is or was let to the applicant by a private landlord” 
(at [12]). Given that it is possible to have article 8 rights arising through occupation of 
a property where there is no property right, it is clear that neither the relationship with 
the freeholder or leaseholder of that property, nor the identity of that right-holder, can 
be determinative of the fact or otherwise of a property constituting someone’s 
“home”. This is a matter of factual degree of connection with the property. In relation 
to the second conclusion, section 6(3) Human Rights Act 1998 specifies that the court 
is a public authority.  
 
Is a proportionality test required? 
 
The difficulty with this case is not the result reached. The mandatory wording of 
section 21 means that whatever the case law of the ECtHR required, and whatever the 
statutory obligation in section 3(1) HRA 1998 was intended to achieve, the Court was 
bound by the statutory language to make a possession order with no proportionality 
test. There is no discretion on their part, and no opportunity on the statutory language 
to superimpose a proportionality test on top of the statutory procedure. Arden LJ does 
not make this aspect of the case central to her conclusion (see [56]), unsurprising 
perhaps given her view of the European authorities, but it is nevertheless sufficient to 
dispose of the instant case. The only option available, and one which was not put to 
the court, would have been to make a declaration of incompatibility on the basis of 
section 4 HRA 1998.  
 
However, in holding that it was not bound to apply a proportionality test, the court 
over-simplifies the Strasbourg case law, and as such, fails to engage with the different 
types of horizontal effect which may arise (see A L Young, ‘Mapping Horizontal 
Effect’ in D Hoffman, The Impact of the UK Human Rights Act on Private Law 
(Cambridge, CUP 2011) pp 16-47 at 18). The consequences of this are potentially 
significant where the relevant statutory provision does give the court discretion. The 
court fails, in effect, to distinguish between: statutory horizontal effect, which arises 
through the court’s obligation to interpret statutory provisions in a Convention-
compliant way; “common law” horizontal effect, where existing common law rules 
would be reinterpreted and shaped so as to protect Convention rights; and direct 
horizontal effect, where a new rule is created such that a private individual relies 
directly on their Convention right in an action against another private individual. The 
court is quite right that there is no clear and consistent case law that direct horizontal 
effect is required in situations involving a private landlord, but the case law is clear 
that statutory provisions must be interpreted in such a way as to ensure that any 
interference with article 8 rights are proportionate. By failing to make this distinction, 
the court fails to give clear direction for future cases of this sort.   
 
The reason why this over-simplification occurs is that in Arden LJ’s analysis of the 
relevant European case law, there is a focus on the precise relationship between 
landlord and tenant, rather than the mechanisms by which article 8 is said to be 
relevant to that relationship. This results in a misrepresentation of the effect of the 
relevant European authorities. Her ladyship’s reasoning is that although article 8 is 
engaged, the fact of the article being engaged does not necessarily mean that a 
proportionality test should be applied (at [16]). Although strictly true, this compresses 
the reasoning required to reach this conclusion, obscuring the key questions that must 
be asked.  
 
The only way to assess an interference with a Convention right is on the basis of the 
proportionality test. The proportionality assessment is required if there has been an 
interference by a public authority thanks to the text of article 8(2) itself. If such an 
interference cannot be shown to be proportionate, then it is not permitted. If no 
proportionality test is carried out, this conclusion cannot be reached and again, the 
matter cannot stand. The fact that article 8 is engaged therefore necessitates the 
proportionality test if there has been an interference by a public authority.  
 
Therefore, the only relevant question therefore is whether, in fact, there has been an 
interference with that right by the Court, the only applicable public authority. This is 
the question of horizontal effect. But importantly, horizontal effect is capable of 
multiple forms as discussed. The specific situation before the court was whether 
(absent national law precedent to the contrary), article 3(1) would oblige the court, as 
far as possible, to interpret the provisions of section 21 Housing Act 1998 as requiring 
a proportionality assessment on the grounds that in actions for possession against a 
tenant by a private landlord, where the property in question was that tenant’s home, 
any interference with that possession must be shown to be proportionate. Thus, the 
relevant question was whether there was clear and consistent case law that article 8 
has statutory horizontal effect.  
 
Lady Arden divides the case law she considers into two categories: those where a 
proportionality assessment was required (Brezec v Croatia [2014] HLR 3; Zrilic v 
Croatia App. No 46726/11; Buckland v United Kingdom [2013] HLR 2; Zehentner v 
Austria (2011) 52 EHRR 22; Belchikova v Russia App. No.2408/06; and Khurshid 
Mustafa and Tarzibachi v Sweden (2011) 52 EHRR 24) and those were a 
proportionality assessment was not required (Di Palma v United Kingdom (1986) 10 
EHRR 149). Perhaps the imbalance here speaks volumes, but further consideration 
reveals that the key difference between the bulk of the case law and Di Palma is that 
in Di Palma the relevant legislation was drafted in such a way that there was no room 
for statutory horizontal effect. As Lord Scott explains in Harrow London Borough 
Council v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43, [2004] 1 AC 983 at [130], Di Palma is authority for 
the principle that “article 8 rights could not suffice against an owner of property with 
an otherwise unimpeachable right to possession”. The right could not be directly 
invoked, but if the statute could be interpreted so as to make that right to possession a 
matter for discretion, the exercise of that discretion, as the bulk of the Strasbourg 
authority reveals, must include an assessment of the proportionality of the grant of 
possession. As Lady Arden herself reasoned, the case is authority for “the principle 
that parties who have exercised their contractual freedom to agree terms should not be 
allowed to invoke Convention rights to relieve themselves of the terms of the bargain” 
(at [37]). It is not authority against the proposition that legislative interventions of the 
state, applied by the courts, must be interpreted in such a way as to ensure that 
interferences with article 8 rights to a home are proportionate.  
 
Furthermore, although not binding, there is a line of national law authority that would 
indicate that article 8 is capable of such of horizontal effect. Firstly, there is case law 
that article 8 requires convention-compliant interpretation of legislation relating to 
possession actions at the request of a trustee in bankruptcy (Barca v Mears [2004] 
EWHC 2170 (Ch), [2005] 2 FLR 1, Nicholls v Lan [2006] EWHC 1255 (Ch), [2007] 
1 FLR 744). In this situation the provision in question (section 335A Insolvency Act 
1986) requires that possession must be granted unless exceptional circumstances 
dictate otherwise. The court therefore has some discretion, and that discretion means 
that a proportionality assessment must feed into the interpretation of the “exceptional 
circumstances” test (Barca v Mears at [37]. Secondly, there is case law that article 14 
will have such statutory horizontal effect in actions against private landlords as seen 
in the decision of the House of Lords in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza ([2004] UKHL 
30, [2004] 2 AC 557) where article 14 was given statutory horizontal effect in the 
process of interpretation of the Rent Act 1977. This is, clearly, not an article 8 case, 
and therefore is not binding on the point, but there is little reason in logic why the 
approach in Godin-Mendoza does not apply equally to article 8.  
 
The equivocation of the courts in relation to horizontal effect of article 8 against 
private landowners expressed in Manchester City Council v Pinnock ([2010] UKSC 
45, [2011] 2 AC 104) and Malik v Fassenfelt ([2013] EWCA Civ 798, [2013] 3 
EGLR 99) are not, therefore, the only relevant authorities on this question, even if 
there is no binding authority that in this particular set of circumstances, statutory 
provisions must be interpreted so as to make space for a proportionality assessment if 
article 8 rights are interfered with.  In failing to examine the broader range of relevant 
authority, the Court of Appeal continues the practice of the national courts of failing 
to engage fully with status of human rights arguments in disputes between private 
parties. The number and breadth of property law cases in which human rights 
concerns have been raised means that some structure in approach is required. The 
Court of Appeal here is as reluctant as the Supreme Court in Pinnock to provide it.  
 
Poplar Housing v Donoghue 
 
Finally, the court also held that even if the ECtHR authorities did require that in 
general, statutory provisions governing the landlord/ tenant relationship must be 
interpreted in a Convention-compliant manner, the decision in Poplar meant that the 
court could not interpret section 21 so as to include a proportionality test. “Once it is 
decided that section 21(4) is compatible with Article 8, it is not open to a court bound 
by that decision to deal with the matter” (at [55]). This is correct. The court must 
conclude that section 21(4) is compliant with article 8. The ECtHR could disagree of 
course, and given the history of the reasoning in Poplar in the context of public 
authorities (culminating in the decision in Pinnock), such does seem possible. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal is right here to say that the decision precludes a 
finding that the section be interpreted differently (not that, on the wording of the 




In his concluding remarks, Ryder LJ states, “[w]here Parliament has determined the 
balance of rights in legislation and mandates the decision the court must make, then 
unless the legislation is found to be incompatible with the Convention right, the 
balance struck is determinative given the wide margin of appreciation in the field of 
housing law” (at [70]). The key word is “mandates”. Where a possession order or 
similar is mandatory, it is correct that article 8 cannot be directly invoked so as to get 
around that mandatory statutory provision. The only option is for a declaration of 
incompatibility. That conclusion is the correct conclusion to reach in the instant case 
involving section 21(4) precisely because the wording of that section is mandatory.  
 
However, that is not the answer to actions for possession by private landlords where 
the court does have discretion, in relation to some grounds for Rent Act or Housing 
Act tenancies, for example. Failure to distinguish between an obligation relating to 
interpretation, for which there is clear and consistent Strasbourg authority, and highly 
persuasive national authority, and the ability to directly invoke a Convention right, 
obscures the role that Convention rights must play in the private landlord/tenant 
relationship. Discussion of the rights and wrongs of horizontal effect must be left for 
another day, but what the decision in McDonald v McDonald fails to do is provide a 
clear framework within which that discussion can take place. The constant failure of 
the higher courts to engage fully with the different types of horizontal effect is much 
to be lamented, since it leaves much uncertainty both for landlords and tenants alike.   
